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I. KENDALL HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE STATUTES
BASED ON TRADITIONAL STANDING AND BASED ON
ALTERNATIVE STANDING.
Under Utah law, a plaintiff can establish standing to challenge a statute 
under two main tests. The traditional standing test requires the plaintiff to show a 
distinct and palpable injury. See Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality 
Bd., 2006 UT 74, ¶ 19, 148 P.3d 960. The alternative standing test requires the 
plaintiff to show the issue is of sufficient public importance and the plaintiff is an 
appropriate party to bring suit. See BV Lending, LLC v. Jordanelle Special Serv. 
Dist., 2013 UT App 9, ¶ 12, 294 P.3d 656. Kendall has standing under both tests. 
A. Because Kendall suffers and has suffered a distinct and palpable
injury, he has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statutes. 
The Appellees, Brett Olsen, Brian Purvis, Joseph Allen Everett, Tom 
Edmundson, George S. Pregman, and Salt Lake City Corporation (collectively the 
“City Defendants”), and the State are incorrect in their assertions that Kendall 
does not have standing in this case because they refuse to acknowledge the distinct 
and palpable injuries that Kendall has suffered and is suffering. See City 
Defendants’ Brief 14; State’s Brief, 5. To have traditional standing, a party must 
show it has suffered or will suffer a “distinct and palpable injury” that gives the 
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party a “personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute.” Utah Chapter of 
Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, ¶ 19, 148 P.3d 960.  
 To determine whether a party has suffered or is suffering a distinct and 
palpable injury, the Utah Supreme Court has applied a three-part test that requires 
a party to show: 
(1) that [the party] has been or will be adversely affected by the 
[challenged] actions, (2) that a causal relationship [exists] between 
the injury to the party, the [challenged] actions and the relief 
requested, and (3) that the relief requested is substantially likely to 
redress the injury claimed. 
 
State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ¶ 46, 345 P.3d 1226 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). This three-part test is undisputedly the correct analysis, but cases 
decided much earlier did not apply it or anything substantially similar to it. For 
example, in Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240 (Utah 1980), cited at length by the 
City Defendants, the Utah Supreme Court used a wholly different analysis to 
determine that appellants who claimed a filing fee statute violated article I, section 
4 of the Utah Constitution did not have standing. Id. at 242. The appellants in 
Hoyle had argued that the Utah Constitution prohibited “the requirement of a 
property qualification” for holding office. Id. While the analysis in Hoyle is not 
readily apparent, it appears the Court determined the appellants could afford the 
filing fee and therefore were not in the class of people who were barred from 
office by the filing-fee requirement. Id. Hoyle, however, was decided more than 
twenty-five years before Sierra Club and about thirty-five years before Roberts. 
The Hoyle court did not apply the three-part test articulated in Sierra Club and 
3 
Roberts, which was based on a test first articulated in Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 
1145, 1150 (Utah 1983). In fact, Hoyle was decided three years before Jenkins. 
The conclusion in Hoyle that a plaintiff lacks standing when challenging a fee if 
the plaintiff has the ability to pay the fee likely would have been different if the 
Court had the benefit of the current three-part “traditional test” in Roberts. If, as 
the City Defendants seek, Hoyle is read to stand for a rule that a plaintiff will 
always lack standing to challenge a fee if the plaintiff has the ability to pay the fee, 
then it has clearly been overruled by Jenkins and its progeny. Any analysis of 
standing, therefore, must begin with the three-part test.  
The trial court in this case failed to perform the three-part test and both the 
City Defendants and the State failed to apply the three-part test on appeal. See R. 
549; City Defendants’ Brief, 16; State’s Brief, 7. Applying the correct test to the 
facts of this case, it is clear Kendall has standing. 
First, Kendall has been adversely affected by both Utah Code section 78B-
3-104 (the “Bond Statute”) and Utah Code section 63G-7-601 (the “Undertaking
Statute”).1 Under the Bond Statute, the City Defendants attempted to force 
Kendall to put up a bond in the amount found by the trial court to be the fees and 
costs that will be incurred in the future by the police officer defendants or abandon 
his claims against them. Facing these intimidating, arbitrary, and unconstitutional 
actions, Kendall was forced to contest the bond or forfeit his state law claims 
1 The Bond Statute and the Undertaking Statute together are referred to herein as 
the “Statutes.” 
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against the defendants. This resulted in thousands of dollars in attorney fees and a 
nine-month delay in his case. See R. 1–34; 592–600; 759. This delay is highly 
problematic because memories fade over time and key witnesses can find it 
difficult to recall important details so long after the events occurred. See Myers v. 
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981). 
 The time, expense, and procedural disadvantages are concrete adverse 
effects that Kendall suffered, and is suffering, as a direct result of the Bond 
Statute. The Undertaking Statute adversely affected Kendall in a similar way. 
Because the bond can be set at any amount, Kendall was required to spend time 
and money contesting it along with the Bond Statute. Even paying the statutory 
minimum undertaking is an adverse effect. A “temporary, nonfinal deprivation of 
property is nonetheless a ‘deprivation.’” See Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 535 
P.2d 713, 719 (Cal. 1975) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Now that the case has been removed to federal court, Kendall is still in 
danger of being forced to file a bond and an increased undertaking. As the City 
Defendants point out, Rule DUCivR 67-1(c) now applies. City Defendants’ Brief, 
34. That rule clearly states that the federal court “may review, fix, and adjust the
amount of the required undertaking or bond as provided by law.” DUCivR 67-
1(c). The Statutes continue to adversely affect Kendall, hanging over his head 
during the pendency of the litigation. At any point in time, the bond and 
undertaking may be adjusted, and if Kendall does not have the money on hand or 
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cannot afford or is unwilling to put that money at risk, he faces forfeiting his vital 
claims.  
The City Defendants inadvertently admit the Statutes have adversely 
affected Kendall by asserting Kendall’s case is “a classic example” of the kind of 
litigation “the bond and undertaking statutes were intended to discourage.” City 
Defendants’ Brief, 30 n.14. They admit, therefore, that the Statutes are designed to 
discourage litigation through the adverse effects they impose on plaintiffs. If there 
were no adverse effects, then there would be no power to “discourage.” Therefore, 
as the City Defendants admit, the Statutes have adversely affected Kendall. 
Second, there is a causal relationship between the injury, the challenged 
Statutes, and the relief sought. But for the Statutes, Kendall’s claim would not 
have been delayed for nine months and he would not have had to spend thousands 
of dollars in attorney fees and costs. See R. 1–34; 592–600; 759. The City 
Defendants and the State wish to look back with hindsight and argue that Kendall 
did not need to expend time and money to challenge the Statutes because, 
eventually, they resulted only in a $300 undertaking. However, this result, which 
is admittedly better than a bond and an undertaking possibly totaling several 
hundred thousand dollars, was only achieved after Kendall vigorously contested 
the bond and the undertaking. See R. 737. A plaintiff who faces a requirement to 
post an undertaking for costs in an amount to be determined by the court cannot 
disregard the Undertaking Statute in the same casual way the State does when it 
claims the undertaking requirement “seldom, if ever” results in “an amount greater 
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than $300.” See State’s Brief, 16. The nature of the Statutes effectively requires a 
plaintiff, like Kendall, to vigorously contest the bond and undertaking because any 
half measures could result in a costly bond and undertaking that would effectively 
bar the plaintiff from access to the courts or impose a substantial and unequal 
barrier to access on a narrow class of plaintiffs not imposed on other plaintiffs. 
Therefore, under the Statutes, it is necessary for a plaintiff to expend time and 
money contesting the bond and undertaking or risk either forfeiting the plaintiff’s 
claims or enduring a substantial, unequal barrier to access to the courts. There is 
obviously a direct causal link between the application of the unconstitutional 
Statutes and the past and continuing adverse effects.  
The relief sought is also causally linked to the injury sustained as a result of 
the challenged Statutes. Kendall sought declaratory relief so that he could pursue 
claims without the immense burden of the bond and the undertaking blocking or 
significantly impairing his access to the courts and hanging over his head during 
the litigation. This relief is still required and is directly related to the validity of the 
Statutes. If the Statutes are deemed to be invalid, Kendall will not continue to face 
the prospect of having to post a bond or have an increased undertaking imposed. 
Also, if the Statutes are deemed to be invalid, Kendall will no longer be deprived 
the $300 previously posted as an undertaking. 
Third, the relief requested is substantially likely to redress the injury. 
Kendall’s $300 undertaking would be returned to him, and he would no longer 
face the possibility the bond might be increased at a later date. The trial court, 
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instead of granting the relief sought, found that Kendall was impecunious and 
waived the bond on that basis. The trial court, however, in upholding the 
constitutionality of the Statutes, ignored the nine months and great expense that 
Kendall sustained to contest the Statutes. Kendall continues to be injured by the 
facts that he is still deprived of the amount he was required to pay for the 
undertaking and that the federal court could, at any time, particularly if Kendall is 
no longer “impecunious,” adjust the amount required. Therefore, the relief 
requested is necessary to protect Kendall’s rights. 
The Statutes adversely affect Kendall and there is a causal link between the 
Statutes and the injury. The relief sought is substantially likely to redress the 
injury and ensure no further harm occurs. Therefore, Kendall has traditional 
standing to challenge the Statutes. The trial court erred when it failed to apply the 
correct analysis. The City Defendants and the State err in relying on Hoyle for a 
bright-line rule when Jenkins and its progeny require the application of the three-
part test. 
 B.  Kendall also has alternative standing because he is an 
appropriate plaintiff and the issue has significant importance to the public. 
 
 The City Defendants are incorrect when they claim Kendall does not 
qualify for alternative standing. See City Defendants’ Brief, 17. Alternative 
standing requires that the plaintiff show the issue is of sufficient public importance 
and the plaintiff is an appropriate party to bring suit. See BV Lending, LLC v. 
Jordanelle Special Serv. Dist., 2013 UT App 9, ¶ 12, 294 P.3d 656. 
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An appropriate plaintiff is one that has a personal interest in the outcome of 
the litigation such that it can “effectively assist the court in developing and 
reviewing all relevant and legal factual questions.” Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. 
Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, ¶ 42, 148 P.3d 960 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). An issue of public importance is usually an issue that 
affects the public as whole and not just individual future plaintiffs. See BV 
Lending, 2013 UT App 9, ¶ 14. This Court has collected and summarized cases on 
public importance as follows: 
[I]n City Defendants of Grantsville v. Redevelopment Agency of
Tooele City, 2010 UT 38, 233 P.3d 461, the party seeking alternative
standing alleged that Tooele City and its redevelopment agency had
breached an agreement relating to the redevelopment of a
decommissioned military base by selling the property and using the
proceeds for the benefit of Tooele City rather than the members of
the broader Tooele County community that were affected by the
base’s closing. Id. ¶ 6. The supreme court determined that
Grantsville City had alternative standing to bring its claims because
the entire community had an interest in having the issue litigated due
to its having a stake in the sale or development of the military base.
Id. ¶ 19. Similarly, in Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air
Quality Board, 2006 UT 74, 148 P.3d 960, the issue raised by the
party seeking alternative standing was whether the Executive
Secretary of the Utah Division of Air Quality had complied with
state and federal law in approving the construction of a power plant.
Id. ¶ 3. The supreme court considered this to be an issue of public
importance because the alleged violations would directly affect the
entire community due to the power plant’s proximity to homes and
Capitol Reef National Park. Id. ¶ 44. . . .
Id. ¶ 15. 
In this case, the City Defendants badly err when they assert Kendall lacks 
an “interest in the injury he seeks to redress.” City Defendants’ Brief, 19. As 
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previously discussed, the application of the Statutes has injured and continues to 
injure Kendall in significant ways. His claims were delayed for nine months. See 
R. 1–34; 592–600. He spent thousands of dollars in attorney fees and costs. See R. 
759. And he continues to be deprived of the undertaking he was required to post 
and faces the ongoing threat of being required to post a bond and pay an increased 
undertaking. Therefore, Kendall has a paramount interest in the constitutionality of 
the Statutes. This interest has motivated Kendall to provide this Court with a 
thorough analysis of all relevant legal and factual issues. In response to the 
Appellant’s brief, the City Defendants and the State have also fully briefed the 
legal and factual issues to aid this Court in reaching a conclusion. Therefore, 
Kendall is an appropriate plaintiff, and this Court has all the necessary information 
to rule on this issue. 
The constitutionality of the Statutes is an issue of great importance to the 
public as a whole, and not just to future individual plaintiffs. The general public 
has three overarching interests in the outcome of this appeal. First, the public has 
an interest in curbing police misconduct through appropriate and accessible 
deterrents. As the Utah Supreme Court has noted, denying citizens meaningful 
access to the courts to hold law enforcement officers accountable for their 
wrongful acts “could open the way to any kind of oppressive treatment however 
cruel or diabolical, without the perpetrator being brought to account.” See Zamora 
v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 81 (Utah 1981).  
10 
Second, the citizens of Salt Lake City have an interest in the conduct of the 
police force that represents, protects, and serves them. As the United States 
Supreme Court has observed, “[I]t is the public at large which enjoys the benefits 
of the government’s activities, and it is the public at large which is ultimately 
responsible for its administration.” Owen v. City of Indep., Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 655 
(1980). Therefore, the issue of whether these Statutes unconstitutionally block and 
deter lawsuits, like Kendall’s, that form the principle deterrents against police 
misconduct, is of enormous importance to the public. 
Third, the public has a vital interest in the administration of its justice 
system to ensure everyone has access to the courts, equal protection of the laws, 
and due process under those laws. See id. The United States Supreme Court has 
long held that the public has a responsibility in a “democracy for the wise conduct 
of the government.” See First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 
(1978); see also Carole Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the 
Petition Clause of the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557 
(1999) (“This nation has long viewed a person’s ability to gain access to court as a 
fundamental element of our democracy.”); Jethro K. Liberman, THE LITIGIOUS 
SOCIETY 31 (1981) (“It is . . . fundamental to any humane society that a person 
may seek recompense from those who injure.”). These Statutes unduly burden 
access to the courts and create a two-tiered justice system wherein the extremely 
wealthy can seek justice, but the poor and those who cannot afford to risk their 
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assets are denied. The public has a responsibility to ensure that its public 
institutions function in a just and equitable manner.  
As additional proof of the public interest in whether a certain class of 
claimants should face the significant barriers imposed by the Statutes, several local 
and national news outlets found this issue of sufficient public importance to 
publish stories about the barriers Kendall faces in accessing the courts. See, e.g., 
Christopher Smart, Utah man faces financial hurdle to sue the officer who shot his 
dog, Geist, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, (June 24, 2015), 
http://www.sltrib.com/home/2660648-155/man-faces-financial-hurdle-to-sue; 
Utah man must pay for permission to sue officer who killed his dog, THE WEEK, 
(June 25, 2015), http://theweek.com/speedreads/562732/utah-man-must-pay-
permission-sue-officer-who-killed-dog. 
 Kendall is an appropriate plaintiff and the issues he raises are vital to the 
public. Therefore, even if he did not have traditional standing, he has alternative 
standing. 
II. THE APPEAL IS NOT MOOT AND KENDALL STILL REQUIRES 
THE RELIEF HE SOUGHT IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
 
 The City Defendants contend that this appeal is moot because a 
determination of the constitutionality of the Bond Statute and the Undertaking 
Statute will not affect Kendall’s rights. City Defendants’ Brief, 14. Again, the City 
Defendants refuse to acknowledge the harm the Statutes have caused, and continue 
to cause, Kendall. Because Kendall’s rights have been impinged upon and because 
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they are still in jeopardy, the issues he raises are not moot. “A case is deemed 
moot when the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants.” 
Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added). 
In this case, judicial relief is still necessary to protect Kendall’s rights. The 
City Defendants’ position that there can be no “actual relief” is particularly 
suspect because in the very same paragraph they admit that Kendall has already 
been forced to post a $300 undertaking. City Defendants’ Brief, 13. A ruling from 
this Court that the Undertaking Statute is unconstitutional would result in an 
immediate refund of that $300. Perhaps the City Defendants find $300 to be an 
insignificant amount, and therefore not worthy of any “actual relief.” But $300 is a 
significant amount to many Americans who live paycheck to paycheck. See Kelley 
Holland, 62% of Americans can’t cover unexpected expenses, CNBC.COM, (Jan. 7, 
2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/01/07/60-percent-of-americans-cant-cover-
unexpected-expenses.html. The City Defendants cite neither case law nor statute 
to support the proposition that matters involving $300 are somehow moot.2  
Kendall’s issue with the Bond Statute is also not moot because, as the City 
Defendants concede, DUCivR 67-1(c) allows a federal court to “review, fix, and 
adjust the amount of the required undertaking or bond as provided by law.” 
DUCivR 67-1(c). To succeed on its claim of mootness, the City Defendants must 
2 While the State does not join the City Defendants in their mootness claim, it does 
suffer from the same disturbing insouciance regarding the $300 undertaking. 
Despite the fact most Americans today would have to go into debt to pay a $300 
undertaking, the State describes this as “no more than a speed bump.” State’s 
Brief, 4.  
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show that “judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants.” Burkett, 773 
P.2d at 44 (emphasis added). Instead, they have shown the opposite by 
emphasizing that, according to DUCivR 67-1(c), Kendall is still subject to the 
imposition of a bond and greater undertaking under the unconstitutional Statutes. 
City Defendants’ Brief, 34. 
Finally, and most importantly, the City Defendants refuse to acknowledge 
the extreme hardships the Statutes have already caused Kendall. To protect his 
constitutional rights, he was forced to use extensive, costly, and time consuming 
efforts to oppose the imposition of the bond and undertaking requirements, which 
could have totaled more than hundreds of thousands of dollars. R. 228, 232, 737. 
This delayed his litigation for nine months and cost him thousands of dollars in 
attorney fees and costs. See R. 1–34; 592–600; 759. 
The crucial issues presented in this matter are not moot. Kendall is entitled 
to a ruling on the merits. 
III. AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE APPLIES IN 
THIS CASE BECAUSE KENDALL RAISES ISSUES OF PUBLIC 
IMPORTANCE THAT ARE LIKELY TO RECUR BUT EVADE REVIEW. 
 
 Even if, for some reason, Kendall’s issues were technically moot, the public 
interest exception would still apply. “The public interest exception to the mootness 
doctrine arises when the case [1] presents an issue that affects the public interest, 
[2] is likely to recur, and [3] because of the brief time that any one litigant is 
affected, is capable of evading review.” Guardian ad Litem v. State ex rel. C.D., 
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2010 UT 66, ¶ 13, 245 P.3d 724 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 
75, ¶ 31, 289 P.3d 582 (refusing to recognize a per se “public interest exception” 
and requiring the appropriate three-part test). 
 First, as previously discussed, this case is a matter of great public 
importance. See supra Part I. B. It affects the efficacy of deterrents for police 
misconduct and the training and conduct of the Salt Lake City Police Department 
in particular. It also affects the manner in which our society ensures our justice 
system is accessible and treats all people fairly regardless of their financial 
resources. Equal protection and due process are not just esoteric constitutional 
concepts devoid of meaning in the public sphere. They are ideals that citizens in 
our democracy have a responsibility to protect and promote. These issues are of 
vital public importance. 
 Second, this problem is highly likely to recur. The Statutes are designed to 
discourage litigation and are applied to every case that is brought against a police 
officer in Utah. The City Defendants even assert there were “[s]eventy-four new 
matters asserted against Salt Lake City alone last year.” City Defendants’ Brief, 
45. It is inevitable, therefore, that other plaintiffs will face the same barriers to 
justice that Kendall faces with these Statutes that unfairly and disproportionately 
punish poorer plaintiffs and impose a tremendous burden on even those who can 
afford to post a bond and file an undertaking. This is a constantly recurring 
problem.  
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 Third, the Statutes are capable of evading review. The City Defendants’ 
own mootness argument belies their contention that the public interest exception 
does not apply. If the City Defendants’ position on mootness is adopted, then 
courts would not be able to review any cases in which a plaintiff successfully 
contested the bond and undertaking requirements even though that plaintiff had to 
expend a significant amount of time and money in reaching that result. The City 
Defendants also contend that a smaller undertaking is not worthy of review or 
judicial relief. Furthermore, the City Defendants fail to appreciate the fact that 
many potential plaintiffs with legitimate claims are intimidated and discouraged 
from even starting a case. See Appellant’s Brief, 16–17. In all of these scenarios, 
the validity of the Statutes is capable of evading review. Indeed, if the City 
Defendants have their way, none of these scenarios would ever warrant review. 
Instead the City Defendants argue that this Court should wait until a plaintiff 
comes along who does not have the means and ability to challenge the 
constitutionality of the Statutes and is therefore completely barred from Utah 
courts, but then suddenly has the means and ability to appeal to a higher court. 
Such a scenario is extremely unlikely.3 Therefore, this issue is highly capable of 
evading review. 
                                            
3 For instance, in at least three cases in the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah, claims have been dismissed because of plaintiffs’ failure to 
comply with the Bond Statute or with the Undertaking Statute, without any 
argument by the parties or consideration by the courts of the constitutionality of 
the Statutes. See Appellant’s Brief, 35. 
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 Therefore, Kendall’s case is not moot. The relief he seeks remains 
necessary to protect and vindicate his constitutional rights. But even if the case 
were technically moot, it remains the best possible scenario in which this Court 
could review the Statutes. On matters of such important public interest, this Court 
should embrace the opportunity to address the merits of Kendall’s appeal.  
IV. THE STATE DOES NOT CONTEST THE 
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BOND STATUTE. 
 
 The State has made it clear throughout the proceedings before the trial court 
and on appeal that it does not defend the validity of the Bond Statute. See R. 436–
46; State’s Brief. In fact, the State goes to great lengths to distinguish cases that 
invalidated statutes that required bonds for attorney fees, like the Bond Statute, 
from cases dealing only with undertakings for costs, like the Undertaking Statute. 
See State’s Brief, 10–11. From a practical perspective, this approach is deeply 
flawed since a plaintiff in Utah who seeks to sue a law enforcement officer does 
not have the luxury of only being subject to one statute and not the other. In any 
event, one must understand this as a concession that the Bond Statue is 
indefensible.  
V. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY APPLIES TO THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAUSE AND UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS 
ISSUES BECAUSE THE STATUTES IMPINGE UPON A FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHT. 
 
 Both the State and the City Defendants argue that this Court should apply 
only rational basis scrutiny to determine whether the Statutes are valid under the 
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United States Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause and under the Utah 
Constitution’s Uniform Operation of Laws Clause. City Defendants’ Brief, 40; 
State’s Brief, 8. Although heightened scrutiny applies, Kendall has established 
that, even under a rational basis analysis, the challenged Statutes are 
unconstitutional. See Appellant’s Brief, 17–24.  
The challenged Statutes must be subjected to heightened scrutiny because 
the Statutes impinge upon or implicate a fundamental right. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 
U.S. 202, 217 (1982); Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 583 (Utah 1993). In Plyler, the 
United States Supreme Court ruled that statutes that create classifications 
impinging upon fundamental rights are “presumptively invidious” and invalid. See 
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217. Under these circumstances, the party defending the law 
must “demonstrate that its classification has been precisely tailored to serve a 
compelling governmental interest.” Id. The United States Supreme Court has 
recognized that “meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the 
protection of the First Amendment.” See United Transp. Union v. State Bar of 
Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971).  
 Under these circumstances, heightened scrutiny should be applied under the 
Utah Constitution as well. In Lee, the Utah Supreme Court considered whether a 
statute of limitations violated the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause because it 
treated “minors who have medical malpractice causes of action differently from 
minors who have causes of action for other kinds of personal injury.” Id. at 577. 
The Court determined that the statute of limitations implicated the constitutional 
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rights contained in Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution. Id. at 583. The 
Lee court applied heightened scrutiny because the statutory scheme “implicated” 
the right of access to the courts. Id. at 584. 
 In this case, the Statutes implicate the fundamental right of meaningful 
access to Utah courts. The undisputed intent of the Statutes is to create deterrents 
and barriers that plaintiffs must overcome before they may have meaningful 
access to the courts. The City Defendants err in their analysis in this regard by 
assuming Utah’s Open Courts Clause can only be implicated to limit the 
Legislature’s ability to abrogate a remedy. As the Utah Supreme Court has ruled, 
“While this clause may not guarantee any specific remedy, it certainly guarantees 
access to the courts.” Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1250 (Utah 1998). Kendall 
has consistently argued that the Statutes unconstitutionally burdened his access to 
courts, and he has not argued that the Legislature has abrogated a “remedy” that 
was previously available at common law. See Appellant’s Brief, 29–30. Therefore, 
the City Defendants err greatly when they attempt to argue that none of the rights 
contained in Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution are implicated in any 
way by the Statutes simply because they “do not abrogate a claim.” See City 
Defendants’ Brief, 41. This misses the point. The Statutes clearly implicate access 
to the courts; therefore, heightened scrutiny must apply both under the federal and 
the state constitutions.  
The State also misses the point when it attempts to argue that heightened 
scrutiny does not apply because the Undertaking Statute does not “seriously 
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impede access to the courts.” State’s Brief, 9. Kendall disputes this conclusion as a 
factual matter, but even if it were taken at face value, it articulates an incorrect 
standard. The standard is whether the Undertaking Statute “implicates” or 
“impinges” on the fundamental right of access to the courts. The standard is not 
whether the statute “seriously impedes” that right. 
Heightened scrutiny applies to both the federal Equal Protection analysis 
and the state Uniform Operation of Laws analysis, which is at least as rigorous as 
its federal counterpart. See Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 
P.2d 884, 889 (Utah 1988). The State has conspicuously refrained from arguing 
that the Undertaking Statute could survive heightened scrutiny. State’s Brief, 9–
13. The City Defendants merely make speculative statements that the Statutes are 
working as intended, but they offer no evidence anywhere in the record that the 
Statutes have anything “more than a speculative tendency to further the legislative 
objective and, in fact, actually and substantially further[] a valid legislative 
purpose.” See Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 583 (Utah 1993). In fact, the City 
Defendants admit they failed to provide “empirical evidence to show that police 
officers are subject to a greater number of harassing and frivolous lawsuits than 
other individuals.” See City Defendants’ Brief, 43. Instead, they attempt for the 
first time on appeal to present evidence that they have many pending lawsuits and 
that they have prevailed on “more than half of those matters.” See State’s Brief, 
45. Even if this evidence were part of the record, it fails to demonstrate that the 
Statutes substantially further a valid legislative objective in any way. These 
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assertions of fact give no indication about whether frivolous lawsuits were actually 
deterred or whether a deterrent is even needed.  
More importantly, the facts asserted by the City Defendants give no 
indication about how many meritorious lawsuits were barred simply because the 
plaintiffs lacked the funds to overcome the barriers the Statutes imposed. In 
contrast, Kendall provided evidence that plaintiffs with meritorious claims are 
often deterred or barred from bringing their claims solely because of the Statutes. 
See R. 727–28, 744, 739. Under heightened scrutiny, the proponent of the 
challenged statute bears the burden of showing the law is appropriately tailored to 
fit its need. See Lee, 867 P.2d at 591. But neither the City Defendants nor the State 
have explained how the Statutes are “reasonably necessary” to achieve a 
legitimate goal, see id. at 583, or “precisely tailored” to a compelling 
governmental interest, see Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217. Based on Kendall’s evidence, it 
is clear the statutes are overbroad and overinclusive. They are discouraging 
meritorious lawsuits and disproportionately punishing poorer plaintiffs. As a 
result, the Statutes cannot survive heightened scrutiny. 
VI. UTAH COURTS HAVE NOT ADDRESSED WHETHER UTAH’S 
CURRENT BOND STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONAL; ZAMORA V. 
DRAPER DEALT WITH A SUBSTANTIVELY DIFFERENT STATUTE. 
 
 The City Defendants have argued that the Utah Supreme Court in Zamora 
v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 79 (Utah 1981), “squarely addressed” whether the Bond 
Statute violates the Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution and found it to be 
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“constitutional on its face.” See City Defendants’ Brief, 20. The State makes a 
similar argument about the Undertaking Statute. See State’s Brief, 17–18. Neither 
the City Defendants nor the State examine the significant textual differences 
between the statute addressed by the Zamora Court and the current Statutes at 
issue in this case. The differences are illuminating. 
The statute in Zamora read: 
Before any action may be filed against any sheriff, constable, peace 
officer, . . . a written undertaking with at least two sufficient sureties 
in an amount to be fixed by the court, . . . for the payment to the 
defendant of all costs and expenses that may be awarded against 
such plaintiff, including a reasonable attorney’s fee to be fixed by 
the court . . . . 
Zamora, 635 P.2d at 79 (emphasis added). 
The Bond Statute in this case reads: 
(1) A person may not file an action against a law enforcement officer
acting within the scope of the officer’s official duties unless the
person has posted a bond in an amount determined by the court.
(2) The bond shall cover all estimated costs and attorney fees the
officer may be expected to incur in defending the action, in the event
the officer prevails.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-104(1)–(2) (emphasis added). 
While both statutes allow a court to set the bond, the current Bond Statute 
takes away the court’s discretion in setting that amount by requiring that the 
amount of the bond “shall cover all estimated costs and attorney fees.” Id. 
(emphasis added). The Court in Zamora tepidly determined that the older statute 
was “not necessarily unconstitutional,” see Zamora, 635 P.2d at 80, but this was 
premised on the observation that the “statute itself allows some flexibility,” see id. 
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at 81. The plain language of the Bond Statute at issue in this case removes that 
flexibility and requires a court to cover “all estimated costs and attorney fees.” 
The Undertaking Statute also lacks flexibility. It requires the bond be “not less 
than $300.” UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-601(2)(a). 
 Both the City Defendants and the State argue that the federal courts have, 
by way of a rule, inserted some flexibility into the Statutes. This, however, is an 
unsatisfactory answer for many reasons. First, Kendall faced the burden of these 
Statutes in a Utah state court where there is no rule like Rule DUCivR 67-1(c) to 
provide sufficient flexibility to satisfy Due Process.  
Second, the very fact the federal courts found it necessary to create a rule 
with greater flexibility indicates the federal courts found the Statutes to be infirm 
on some level. The City Defendants argue that DUCivR 67-1(c) provides 
procedural protections for plaintiffs that are unavailable in Utah courts—including 
a hearing before setting a bond above the minimum $300. See City Defendants’ 
Brief 34, 33. The City Defendants even go so far as to chastise Kendall for 
bringing his claims in state court. City Defendants’ Brief, 33. This seems to admit 
that the Statutes, by themselves, are unconstitutionally inflexible and that the 
procedural protections in Utah courts are lacking. Kendall agrees. 
Third, the flexibility in DUCivR 67-1(c), when applied according to the 
plain text of the Bond Statute, is still insufficient to protect a plaintiff’s 
fundamental rights. As has previously been discussed, DUCivR 67-1(c) means a 
federal court could at any time increase the amount of the bond “as provided by 
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law.” See DUCivR 67-1(c). Therefore, DUCivR 67-1(c) creates some flexibility in 
the timing of setting the bond and undertaking, which is inconsistent with the 
language of the Bond Statute, but it still does not remedy the Statutes’ rigidity 
regarding the amounts of the bond and undertaking. 
As a result, it is highly inaccurate to argue that Zamora has already 
determined the Statutes in this case do not violate Due Process. If anything, 
Zamora illustrates a contrast between what is “not necessarily unconstitutional” 
and what is, in fact, glaringly unconstitutional.  
VII. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY APPLIES TO KENDALL’S DUE
PROCESS CLAIMS BECAUSE THEY DEAL WITH FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS.
Heightened scrutiny applies to the Due Process claims in this case because 
the Statutes burden the fundamental right of access to the courts.4 
In In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court 
addressed what level of scrutiny applied to a Due Process challenge to a statute 
when the appellant argued that the statute was void for vagueness. Id. The Utah 
Supreme Court found that “[w]hen state action impinges on fundamental rights, 
due process requires” a heightened standard. See id. Following Boyer, a long line 
of cases recognized a heightened level of scrutiny for all challenges arising under 
Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution. See, e.g., Hipwell v. Sharp, 858 P.2d 
987, 988 n.4 (Utah 1993); Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 368 (Utah 
4 Although heightened scrutiny applies, the Statutes are also unconstitutional 
under a rational basis analysis. See Appellant’s Brief, 33–40. 
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1989) (Zimmerman, J., concurring); Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1362–63 
(Utah App. 1993).  
In Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 2002 UT 134, ¶ 8, 67 P.3d 436, the 
Utah Supreme Court rejected a blanket application of heightened scrutiny to every 
challenge under Article I, section 11. Id. In Wood, the appellant argued that a 
statute had abrogated a legal remedy. Id. ¶ 10. Because the Utah Supreme Court 
determined that the appellant’s claimed legal remedy was not available at common 
law and had never been recognized in Utah, there was no reason to apply 
heightened scrutiny. See id. ¶ 14. This makes sense because that statute did not 
impinge upon a fundamental right. 
 In this case, however, Kendall has not argued that a remedy has been 
abrogated. Instead, he has argued that the Statutes “have the real effect of denying, 
or significantly burdening and unreasonably delaying, access to the courts for a 
determination of people’s claims, particularly against law enforcement officers, on 
the merits.” Appellant’s Brief, 36. As previously discussed in this Reply Brief, see 
supra Part III, and as discussed in great detail in the Appellant’s Brief, see 
Appellant’s Brief, 29–30, the Statutes impinge on the fundamental right of access 
to the courts. Therefore, a heightened level of scrutiny must apply to the Statutes 
under a Due Process analysis. 
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VIII. THE STATUTES WERE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED TO 
KENDALL BECAUSE THEY REQUIRED HIM TO DELAY HIS 
LITIGATION AND INCUR EXPENSES TO AVOID POSTING A BOND 
AND AN UNDERTAKING. 
 
 The City Defendants erroneously state, without sufficient analysis, that the 
Statutes were not unconstitutional as applied to Kendall “because the district court 
found Kendall impecunious and not required to furnish a bond.” City Defendants’ 
Brief, 47. The City Defendants also argue “the undertaking statute was not 
unconstitutionally applied to Kendall because Kendall was only required to pay a 
$300 undertaking that he stated he could afford.” Id.  
 Once again, the City Defendants ignore the fact Kendall was injured by the 
efforts it took to achieve this result. In other words, the unconstitutional injury had 
already occurred before the trial court made its ruling. The Statutes were 
unconstitutional as applied to Kendall when he was forced to contest them or 
abandon his claims. These efforts cost Kendall thousands of dollars in attorney 
fees and delayed his litigation by nine months. See R. 1–34; 592–600; 759. In the 
end, he was still required to pay $300 that plaintiffs filing suit against non-
governmental defendants were not required to pay. Neither the City Defendants 
nor the State have even attempted to explain how charging one group of plaintiffs 
more for access to the courts serves any legitimate purpose. Instead they shrug off 
Kendall’s injuries as unimportant from their perspective. See, e.g., State’s Brief, 4. 
Fortunately, this is not the standard required by the Utah Constitution or the 
United States Constitution. The City Defendants and the State have merely 
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attempted to avoid Kendall’s as-applied challenges to the Statutes, and therefore 
have not addressed them at all. For the reasons stated above, this Court should find 
that the Statutes are unconstitutional as applied to Kendall. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, Kendall respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse the trial court’s decision and declare the Bond Statute and the Undertaking 
Statute unconstitutional, both facially and as applied to Kendall.  
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